Transgenic Virus-Resistant Papaya:
The Hawaiian ‘Rainbow’ was Rapidly Adopted by Farmers and is of Major Importance in Hawaii Today
Carol Gonsalves
789 Hoolaulea Street
Hilo, Hawaii 96720
David R. Lee
Department of Applied Economics and Management
248 Warren Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853
Dennis Gonsalves
U.S. Pacific Basin Agricultural Research Center
99 Aupuni Street, Suite 204
Hilo, HI 96720
Corresponding author: Carol Gonsalves. carol.gonsalves@verizon.net
Introduction
 Fig. 1. July 2004: Papaya vendors routinely sell Rainbow and other papaya varieties at farmers markets, small grocery stores and supermarkets in Hawaii. Seen here, a showcase at the popular Hilo bay farmers market on the island of Hawaii. |
Rainbow is the premier example of a genetically engineered horticultural crop that made it to market. It is a dream come true for scientists who wished to provide a virus-resistant papaya cultivar for the people of Hawaii. But it is also a dream come true for farmers who had lost so much papaya production to Papaya ringspot virus (PRSV) that they were "almost broke already!" Farmers had waited patiently, kept abreast of the latest news from the scientists, and went to observe the ongoing field tests. One of the farmers mused, "Rainbow, the only hope." Gonsalves et al. wrote about that hope in 1998, "Transgenic Virus-Resistant Papaya: New Hope for Controlling Papaya ringspot virus in Hawaii, then again in 2004, "Transgenic Virus-Resistant Papaya: From Hope to Reality for Controlling of Papaya ringspot virus in Hawaii" (4,5). Gonsalves, a professor in the Department of Plant Pathology at Cornell University at the time he helped develop, test, and commercialize the genetically engineered Rainbow and SunUp PRSV-resistant papaya varieties, and his wife Carol Gonsalves, who worked in his laboratory as a volunteer, decided it was imperative to go beyond the scope of plant pathology in order to measure whether farmers in their home state of Hawaii would adopt the transgenic varieties. In this article, we report on the extremely high initial rate of farmer adoption of Rainbow papaya, based on our survey of essentially all of the registered commercial papaya farmers in the Puna area of Hawaii, the Big Island, where up to 96% of the state’s crop (fresh and processed) was grown.
Events Prior to the Survey
Papaya ringspot virus raised havoc on papaya farms from the time it first appeared in 1992 in Puna, Hawaii’s major papaya-growing region, until 1998 when seed of Rainbow, a transgenic virus-resistant variety, were released to farmers. During this six-year period, Puna’s share of statewide production of the more lucrative fresh fruit market fell from 95% to below 78%. Puna’s problems were reflected in the drop of statewide fresh papaya production from 55.8 million pounds in 1992 to 35.7 million pounds in 1997, just four months prior to the commercial release of Rainbow. This data was reported in the USDA report on Hawaii Papayas, as cited by Gonsalves et al. (5).
Papaya ringspot virus is a killer. Once a plant is infected, it can never recover. Aphids feeding on the leaves of infected papaya trees effectively transmit the virus within seconds of probing on healthy trees. Symptoms begin to appear in about three weeks after infection. Young seedlings die quickly and never grow to produce fruit. Older trees develop yellowed leaves. They produce smaller and smaller fruit and are doomed to a slow death. The viral epidemic that occurred in Puna could not be stemmed by a statewide effort to remove all the infected trees in the area.
 Fig. 2. Looking up into the canopy of a healthy, productive papaya tree (left) versus one that is infected with Papaya ringspot virus (right). |
 A |
 B |
 C |
Fig. 3. Effect of rapid virus spread through commercial fields. A healthy commercial papaya field in Puna, on the verge of the viral epidemic in 1992 (A). Many papaya fields were abandoned by papaya farmers (B and C).
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Fig. 4. Rapid transmission of Papaya ringspot virus to all of the Puna papaya farm areas occurred within two years of the discovery of the virus in a Puna field. Source: Gonsalves, C. 2001. |
Fig. 5. Debut of Rainbow in 1998. On May 1, 1998 a celebratory Hawaiian feast attended by hundreds, including farmers, papaya industry personnel, researchers, politicians, the USDA’s Assistant Secretary, Michael Dunn, and others marked the commercial release of transgenic seeds of virus-resistant Rainbow and SunUp papaya. |
The Survey
Planning. The objective of the research project was to capture adoption data at the earliest timeframe possible in the Puna area on the island of Hawaii since most of the state’s production was located there. This project was self-funded and the work was a thesis project couched within a Master of Arts degree in Liberal Studies from Empire State College (State University of New York), with the assistance of thesis advisor David Lee of Cornell University (2). During the planning stage, C. Gonsalves made several trips to the Puna area and Hilo to learn more about papaya farmers and to gather information from persons who were involved with the papaya industry, including personnel at papaya packing houses, the University of Hawaii, the Papaya Administrative Committee (PAC), Hawaii Agricultural Research Center (who had been contracted by the Papaya Administrative Committee to produce transgenic papaya seeds for the farmers), Hawaii Department of Agriculture, Hawaii Agricultural Statistics Service (HASS), and USDA personnel. The latter, who were working with the PAC, were helpful in advising us on how to obtain the list of commercial papaya farmers through the process provided by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (7). The abovementioned core group provided essential information and help concerning the farmers, farming practices, and cultural considerations, for a broader understanding of the Hawaii papaya industry. Visits were made to all of the farming locations in Puna so that a survey questionnaire could be written, decisions on sampling methods could be made, and a pre-test of the survey could be done.
Methodology. Many of the farms had been abandoned after they were overcome
by the virus, and the farmers (most of whom lease rather than own farmlands)
were no longer actively farming. Other farms were in isolated or difficult-to-reach areas. Thus, a decision was made to obtain names of Puna farmers through
FOIA from the PAC’s list of all papaya farmers in the state of Hawaii and to
pick a sample to interview from that list. Since the PAC was under the oversight
of
the USDA, and all farmers who sold papayas were required to register with the
PAC, this seemed to be the best practice to follow. Unfortunately, since the
papaya industry was in disarray due to the effects of farm closings, the list of
524 farmers and some papaya industry businesses was greatly overstated and not
even close to the current number of papaya farms reported by HASS (as determined
by the number of farms selling at least $1000 worth of papayas per year). HASS
and other industry personnel estimated that there were only about 300 active
farmers in the state of Hawaii. After discussing this problem with the manager
of the PAC, he suggested that a reapplication be made through FOIA for the list
of farmers who had registered to use transgenic seeds when they became
available. In his estimation, this list would include all currently active
papaya farmers. Thus, the names and addresses of 256 farmers, 202 of whom
resided on the island of Hawaii with 171 of these farming in Puna, was
subsequently received. (Note: At the time of the interview, one of the Puna-based farmers had re-located his papaya farm to the Hamakua Coast in an effort
to escape the virus).
Diligent efforts were made to contact all of the 171 farmers in Puna, first by telephone and if there was no response or if no telephone number was available, by letter. Many of the farmers could not be located either by telephone or by letter, and it was not known whether or not they still lived in the area. Of the farmers who were contacted, only a few turned down the opportunity to be interviewed. In all, 93 of the 171 farmers (54%) were interviewed.
All of the interviews were done by C. Gonsalves with questions asked in a consistent manner. Generally, a day of telephone calling, setting up interviews and obtaining directions to homes or other locations alternated with a full day of interviews. Sometimes the first interview started at 7:30 a.m. and the last one at 7:30 p.m. Times and locations of interviews were at the discretion of the farmer. While most farmers wanted to be interviewed at home others requested to be interviewed at their farm, at the PAC office, on a bench outside a doctor’s office, at a table outside of a supermarket, in a fast food restaurant, at a papaya packer’s meeting room, or in their truck in a shopping center parking lot -- while the interviewer stood next to the truck the whole time -- quite a feat, since most interviews took about an hour to complete.
 Fig. 6. Carol Gonsalves interviewing companion farmers at the Papaya Administrative Committee’s conference room. |
When evening interviews were scheduled along isolated, unlit roads, a
reconnaissance trip was taken during the day, to assure success in locating the
house at night. Some of the attempts at
finding a home were challenging and
amusing. One farmer couldn’t remember any street names where he lived, but
assured the interviewer that his house was easy to find because he had five pine
trees in the yard. The interviewer drove in the general vicinity for some time,
scanning the landscape for a house with five tall pine trees, and was chagrined
to find that the homeowner had five small evergreen plants in the yard. Another
farmer insisted he could be found sitting under a mango tree in the middle of a
"camp" of houses, but on the day of the interview it was raining and not a soul
was sitting under the tree. All data were collected during three extended visits
to Hawaii from June to September, 1999.
Survey Results
Farmers were characterized as having adopted the use of the transgenic variety if they had planted seeds of the variety Rainbow between May 1, 1998 (when they became available) and the end of the survey period. Based on this definition, the adoption rate of this new cultivar was astounding, at 76%. Of the 93 respondents, 92 had prepared to receive the free seeds by attending a mandatory education session or watching a video about transgenic papayas and by signing a sublicensing form. A large number of farmers (90%) had already obtained seed.
Results that may be of interest to this readership appear below. These results are drawn from Gonsalves (2) and Gonsalves, Lee, and Gonsalves (3), which report further details.
Description of farmer sample
93 respondents: 84 men and 9 women
Ages ranged from 22 to 73 years (average age 47)
Education completed (in U.S. or Philippines)
29% elementary or high school
43% high school
28% college or other postgraduate school
Ethnic heritage: Filipino 91%, Japanese 4%,
Caucasian/other 4%
Residence location in relation to farm in Puna
90% resided in Keaau or Pahoa
10% resided in Hilo, Honokaa, Pahala, and Pepeekeo
Family income from papaya farm(s)
Percent of family income supplied from the papaya farm
in previous year
12% of families earned 76-100% of income from farm
26% of families earned 50-75% of income from farm
74% of families earned < 50% of income from papayas
32% of families earned 0% of income from papayas
Hours spent weekly working on the farm (not all
farmers reporting)
40 hours
per week = 29 farmers
60+ hours per week = 14 farmers
91 hours per week = 1 farmer
Many farmers (46%) also held off-farm jobs, working
15 to 70
hours per week
Many farmer spouses (47%) also worked on the farm
2.5 to 70 hours
weekly and many worked at off-farm jobs
Farmer adoption of Rainbow papaya
92 farmers were "qualified" to receive seeds by completing
three
obligatory steps: (i) sign up, (ii) attend an education
session or watch a
video explaining transgenic papayas
and how to grow them, and
(iii) sign a
sublicensing form.
It’s important to note that due to an equitable
distribution
plan, all of the farmers did not receive seeds at the same
time, but over a number of months, based on three levels
of priority
favoring those who were "currently and
historically most affected" by Papaya ringspot virus, and
on four prescribed distributions. For
example, in the first
distribution, top priority farmers received two allotments
of two ounces of seeds, for a total of four ounces (6).
Each
two-ounce packet contained about 4,000 seeds,
or enough to plant a half
acre parcel.
90% obtained seed
76% planted seed ("adopters")
19% were harvesting Rainbow fruit
A subset (34 of the 93 farmers interviewed) of adopting
farmers were located in the Kapoho
area, the first and
most severely PRSV-damaged area in Puna. Of these:
94% obtained seed
88% planted seed ("adopters")
29% harvesting first Rainbow fruit
 Fig. 7. Farms in the Kapoho area of Puna were most severely damaged by Papaya ringspot virus. Thus, it is not surprising that 94% of the Kapoho farmers interviewed had obtained seed, and 29% were already harvesting fruit. At the time of the interviews farmers were actively transforming the landscape from one with fields of infected trees (background, yellow trees), to one where the virus-susceptible Kapoho solo were being cut down and replaced by the virus-resistant Rainbow (foreground), and finally to lush fields of Rainbow that were bearing fruit (background, green trees). |
91 farmers expressed their foremost reasons for planting or wanting to plant Rainbow (multiple responses allowed):
87 (96%) Resistance to PRSV
17 (19%) Decrease production risk
15 (16%) Experiment with transgenic papaya
12 (13%) Higher profit
Rapid adoption once farmers obtained their seeds
Of the 71 farmers who adopted (planted their seed):
38% planted less than a month after receiving seeds
42% planted after the first, but before the third month
20% planted between the fourth and ninth month
63 farmers expressed their foremost reasons for delaying or not planting their seeds. The most frequent responses centered on the lack of farmer preparation (multiple responses allowed):
21 (33%) didn’t have land
13 (21%) weren’t ready (needed to prepare land, etc.)
13 (21%) didn’t have enough seeds
11 (17%) didn’t have enough money
Some of the farmers were concerned over market approval
of
transgenic papaya by Japan and Canada, whether local
packing houses
would buy their papaya, and whether the
transgenic papaya would
perform well for other farmers.
However, none of the farmers were
personally against the
use of genetically-modified plants.
 |
Fig. 8. Due perhaps to the special value of the Rainbow seeds, farmers experimented in establishing Rainbow seedlings in pots or trays prior to transplanting them out to the field; this was in contrast to the traditional practice of sowing about 15 seeds directly into the planting hole to ensure survival of direct seeded plants from destruction by mice, birds, slugs, pathogens, water damage, and other pests. |
Production information
First-year cost of producing one acre of nontransgenic
papaya. A
preliminary study and discussions with industry-
related personnel and
some of the farmers suggested that
for many farmers there would be a
sensitivity to answering
questions on farming costs and production, and
that many
of them would not be able to provide specific cost and
production data. Thus, although specific questions were
asked in the
survey, we followed the suggestion of one
of the farmers who said that
while many farmers probably
could not answer all the specific questions
about
production costs, they would be able to provide their
total cost
of production "from the time they clear the
land, until the time they
begin to harvest." The farmer
assured us that this question would
account for costs
during the first year (12 months) of the nontransgenic
papaya growing cycle. All (100%) of the farmers
responded to this
question, but their responses varied
widely, depending on their farm
needs:
First-year production cost: ranged from $800 to
$7,500 per acre
Average first-year production cost: $2,515 per acre
Farmers knew some costs and information precisely,
such as
the specific acreage of land they were leasing,
and the cost per
acre of leased land, as well as land
clearing, seed, and topsoil
that had to be hauled in to
fill the rocky lava planting holes. A
number of items were
considered to be "free" by many farmers. These
included
the cost of nontransgenic Kapoho solo seeds produced
on-farm, labor contributed by family or friends, and
operating a
tractor or truck that they owned. Further
specific information
follows:
Land cost. Eighty-five of the growers farmed on leased
land.
The remaining eight growers farmed on their own
land. Eighty-two of
the 85 farmers who leased land spent
an average of $132 per acre,
although the range of lease
costs went from a high of $650 to a low
of $70 per acre
per year. Only one farmer (one who owned land)
placed
a value on the per acre use cost (at $100 per year).
Land clearing. The average cost of land clearing was
$422 per
acre based on responses from eighty-four of
the 85 farmers who
leased land. Seven of the eight
farmers who owned their land and
responded to this
question had an average per acre cost of $1,721
(with
the lowest cost at $500 and the highest at $3,000).
Nontransgenic seed cost. Twenty-two farmers placed
a value on
the cost of nontransgenic seed planted per
acre, from a high of $300
per acre, to a low of $3 per
acre, with an average cost of $27 per
acre. Seven
farmers said they didn’t know the seed cost, and 64
farmers said that their seeds were free, and did not
cost them
anything because they produced their own
seeds.
Soil. Not all farmers needed to purchase soil because
they
had enough topsoil on their farm. However, on
many of the lava
lands, the rocky planting holes must
first be filled with topsoil
before papaya seeds or
seedlings can be put into the ground. For 71
farmers,
the average cost of topsoil was $75 per acre per year.
Six
other farmers said they didn’t know the cost of soil
they purchased,
and 16 farmers said they did not have
to buy topsoil.
First year cost difference between growing
nontransgenic and
transgenic papaya. Comparative
first year costs of growing
transgenic versus
nontransgenic papaya could be obtained only from
early
adopters, since the survey ended 16 months after the
May 1998
seed distribution. Overall, the early adopters
felt that there was
no difference in the cost of growing
nontransgenic or transgenic
papayas. The only major
change in farming practice was the trend
toward using
transplanted seedlings for planting the transgenics.
This
new practice was a learning experience for farmers since
the
old custom was to sow seeds directly into the planting
holes. This
survey elicited all of the farmers’ opinions
on the first year costs
of growing nontransgenic versus
transgenic papayas (whether they had
planted or not):
| Transgenics cost less: |
2% | |
| Transgenics cost more: |
8% | |
| No difference in
cost: |
25% | |
| No comment/not sure: |
66% |
Since the earliest adopters were in their first four months of harvest, no annual harvest data were collected. However, field trial data over a five year period showed that annual production of Rainbow was greater than 2,242 kg/ha/week, or about 116 metric tons/ha/year which is about 3.5 times the industry average for nontransgenic fruit of about 33.1 metric tons/ha/year (1).
Relation of farm sizes to historical acreage, 1999 transgenic and nontransgenic acreage, net change, and percentage of acreage that is transgenic
(Table 1). Farms were assigned to four size categories, Small,
Medium-small, Medium, and Large, based on a farmer’s historical acres (total nontransgenic acres being grown when a farmer first observed Papaya ringspot virus on the farm). Thus, the year corresponding to the reported historical
acres occurred between 1992 when Papaya ringspot virus first entered the
Puna area, and on through 1997, by which time all respondents had observed
Papaya ringspot virus in their fields. Overall, farms were as small as a
one-acre plot of land, and as large as 305 acres.
